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Abstract
We use ultra high frequency (trade by trade) data to demonstrate that equity price clustering
and pricing predictability around psychologically important prices in Greece switches away
from drachma-focused with the introduction of the euro, but does not immediately switch to
euro-clustering. The change in trader price focus around the euro introduction addresses an
open debate in the clustering literature on whether the presence of clustering is a bias related
to current prices or anchoring to past prices. Our findings of a decline in drachma clustering,
but lack of switch to euro effects supports the case for clustering being a trading feature that
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1 Introduction
We examine the crossover of stock prices in Greece from being denominated in
drachma (up to 30th December 2000) to being denominated in euro (from 2nd
January 2001) in order to gain new insights into the presence and cause of price
clustering and psychological price barriers in equity markets. Applying an ultra
high frequency trade-by-trade dataset of transactions before and after the change
to euro-denomination we are able to use this external market event of a currency
conversion to distinguish between a range of frequently proposed explanations for
price clustering and psychological barriers.
Price clustering is a phenomenon in financial markets where prices tend to be
observed more frequently at some numbers than others. This feature has been ob-
served widely in equity markets, as well as a range of other financial markets. Price
clustering has been identified in stock price levels (Donaldson and Kim, 1993; Brown
and Mitchell, 2008; Hu et al., 2017), the gold market (Ball et al., 1985), oil markets
(Narayan et al., 2011), real estate (Palmon et al., 2004), as well as in more special-
ist markets such as carbon credits (Palao and Pardo, 2012), water markets (Brooks
et al., 2013), and credit default swaps (Meng et al., 2013).
A related, but distinct issue, is that of psychological price barriers. Building on
price clustering, psychological barriers research argues that there are key price levels
that investors pay attention to, and argues that prices moving through these levels
can influence subsequent trading due to increased investor attention. An example of
a price barrier would be the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) moving up through
the 20,000 level. The idea is that investors will view the breach of the 20,000 level
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as somehow meaningful and significant as it is a prominent price point and this will
influence trading around that barrier level. Donaldson and Kim (1993) formally
investigate the impact of psychological barrier breaches in the DJIA and find there
is anomalous trading following barrier breaches of rounded 100 prices (e.g. prices
such as 2,100, 2,200), with prices predictably rising further following rising through
a psychological barrier and falling further after falling through a barrier. Recent
studies by Aragon and Dieckmann (2011), Woodhouse et al. (2016), and Berk et al.
(2017) confirm the initial finding of Donaldson and Kim (1993) that psychological
barriers are a feature of equity pricing. Even more so than price clustering, the
presence of psychological barriers has clear implications for market efficiency due to
the implied predictability of price movements. Psychological barriers effects have
also been found across a range of financial markets outside of equities, including
oil (Dowling et al., 2016), gold (Aggarwal and Lucey, 2007), and a range of metal
commodities (Cummins et al., 2015).
An issue in studies on price clustering and psychological barriers is understanding
why such pricing effects might be evident, and this is the issue to which we ad-
dress this study using a novel dataset and setting. A number of explanations have
been proposed for clustering. An initial explanation was that of microstructure ef-
fects; that there is some feature in market structures that leads prices towards being
quoted more at certain digits than others (Niederhoffer, 1965). This could include
minimum tick sizes defaulting prices to ending in certain digits. This argument has
largely faded away as markets have, over time, become evidently more efficient at
the transactional level and yet clustering has remained. For example, Ohta (2006)
use tick-by-tick Japanese equity data to show strong price clustering around prices
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ending in 0 and 5 yen despite minimum tick size being one yen and only the most
liquid stocks being tested.
The two main current explanations for the presence of clustering, and by exten-
sion psychological barriers in the sense they they explain investor attention to price
levels, are the attraction hypothesis and the aspiration hypothesis. The attraction
hypothesis says that investors, faced with bounded rationality, show a preference for
rounded numbers and pay greater attention to such numbers. Thus there is greater
prevalence of prices ending in 0 or 5 digits, followed by even digits, and lastly odd
digits (Niederhoffer, 1965; Ohta, 2006). This feature of pricing has important impli-
cations for the price discovery process of an asset, as it implies that market agents
tend to trade on more salient or memorable numbers when submitting an order or
quoting a price. As a consequence, prices are (at least temporarily) deviated from
their true value, with implications for factors such as stock price volatility which in
turn affects asset valuation and investment strategies. A related perspective takes
the view that the presence of uncertainty in investor decision making reduces incen-
tives to search for a precisely correct stock price. This leads to prices being priced
at rounded numbers as a preference compared to the feasible range of other ending
digits. As such the theory is a feature of current pricing; in that with reference to
the feasible range of current prices, rounded numbers are chosen as a preference.
The alternative proposal, the aspiration level hypothesis, incorporates anchoring
to develop a historically driven perspective on clustering. Under this theory investors
set a target sell price when buying an equity or at some point in their ownership of
the equity, and this tends to be a rounded price point, leading to eventual trading at
these rounded price points. Analysts also set target prices in similar rounded price
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points which further influences the setting of rounded price aspiration targets.
The difference then between the aspiration level hypothesis and the attraction hy-
pothesis is that for the aspiration level hypothesis the reason for clustering is historic,
while for the attraction hypothesis the reason for clustering is current. While this is
normally difficult to distinguish in terms of testing as we just have the actual traded
prices, the crossover from national currency to the euro in a number of European
countries provides an interesting natural experiment setting in which to test between
the two hypotheses. Namely, if the aspiration level hypothesis holds then post the
introduction of the euro clustering should remain, at least for a while, influenced by
the original currency as aspiration levels will have been set in this currency. There
will be a slow decay in influence of the original currency as new trades lead to price
aspiration levels being increasingly priced in the new currency. If the attraction hy-
pothesis holds then clustering should quickly switch from being determined by the
old currency to being determined by the new currency.
Our paper addresses these issues of alternative interpretations through focusing
on the period around the original introduction of the euro currency in 2001 in Greece,
using Greek equities as a setting. On 30th December 2000 the Athens Stock Exchange
closed with prices denominated in drachmae and on 2nd January 2001 the market
opened with all stock prices denominated in euros. With the introduction of the
euro currency, a conversion occurred in Greece of all prices at a fixed rate of 1 euro
equals 340.75 drachma, implying a stock previously priced at, say, 10,000 drachmae
would have opened for euro-denominated trading repriced at e29. The relevant
minimum tick sizes switched from 5 drachma to e0.02 at this time1. In the presence
1These were the tick sizes for the most common price range of stocks, the tick sizes for low priced stocks changed
from 1 drachma to e0.01
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of clustering we would expect that prices were not evenly spread across multiples of
5 drachma in the drachma period (for the 20 possible price endings for the last two
digits of prices between 00 and 95), nor evenly spread across the 50 possible last two
digits for prices during the e 0.02 tick size euro period. The open issue is the speed
with which clustering switches from being drachma to euro denominated.
Sonnemans (2006) previously investigated the change in price clustering around
the euro introduction for the Netherlands stock market, and found that day-end price
clustering changed from Dutch guilders focused to euro focused immediately upon
changing the currency denomination of prices on the Amsterdam stock exchange.
We make a number of advances on this study. Sonnemans (2006) only examines the
period before crossover and up to the end of the period when guilders were still in use
in the domestic economy for normal transactions. We explore all of this period, but
also the period when both equity prices and cash in the economy had fully switched
to euro. We also use ultra high-frequency trade-by-trade data for the five most traded
stocks on the Athens stock exchange over the crossover period (1998-2003) to see if
the evidence of a crossover of clustering remains at this micro level for a total of about
9 million transactions. This trade-by-trade data offers new insights into the nature
of clustering, beyond just gaining greater understanding of the crossover effect, as
the day-end prices frequently used in clustering studies such as Sonnemans (2006)
can be anomalous compared to prices during the rest of the day (Comerton-Forde
and Putnin, š, 2011). We are further able to better assess speed of adjustment due to
the frequency of our data.
The main contribution of our paper, however, is that we also investigate the nature
of psychological price barriers both before and after the introduction of the euro,
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something which has not previously been studied. This is an interesting angle as it is
not clear a priori whether investors who previously, say, viewed prices crossing whole
1,000 drachma price levels as psychologically significant will automatically switch to,
say, viewing e1 price levels as now significant. Such a study, therefore, informs the
prior research on psychological barriers by determining how quickly investors switch
their reference points of significant price levels when there is a change in pricing
fundamentals. As we have ultra high frequency data for the testing we are not
confined to the standard approach of testing daily closing prices, with the limitations
that entails, and can instead investigate the impact on subsequent trades following a
crossing of a psychologically important price barrier. Our paper is the first paper to
investigate the impact of psychological price barriers at the trade-by-trade level and
thus contributes to a deeper understanding of this whole area of research, primarily
through assessing the trading relevance of psychological barriers and confirming that
the feature is not an artifact of closing prices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The data and methodology
is presented and justified in Section 2. The results and analysis are in Section 3, and
Section 4 concludes.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Data
Our dataset is trade-by-trade prices for the five most traded equities on the Athens
Stock Exchange in Greece at the time of the introduction of the euro2. The time
2The equities are: OTE, National Bank of Greece (NBG), Alpha Bank, Hellenic Petroleum (HelPe), Vodafone
Hellas (Vodafone)
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period runs from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2003, allowing three years of data on
either side of the introduction of the euro on 1 January 2001. During this period the
Greek stock market operated under an order-driven continuous auction mechanism.
Shares were owned about 30 percent by Greek private investors, 40 percent by Greek
institutions, and 30 percent by foreign investors and institutions3. There are about 6
million transactions involving the five equities during the drachma period and about
3 million transactions during the euro period. This equates to about 100 trades per
five minute trading window in the early period, and 50 trades over the same window
in the later period. The lower number of transactions in the second time period
appears to be related to the Greek stock market falling over 60% over this period
following a bubble in the first time period that peeked in September 1999. Given
the trade-by-trade nature of our testing, this broad market movement should not
influence our findings.
2.2 Price clustering methodology
Price clustering is assessed in this paper primarily through barrier proximity tests.
These tests detect whether price observations around certain price points conform
to what would otherwise be expected from a uniform distribution. We can illustrate
this with an example of an equity that varies between e 8 and e 35 over a time
period. The presence of price clustering could be demonstrated by showing anoma-
lous frequency of prices around two strata of price barrier levels for this equity. The
first is prices clustering around whole euro levels (e.g. e8, e9, e10 ... e35), and
whole e10 levels, in our case the levels of e10, e20, and e30. Frequency of prices
3Data from the Athens Stock Exchange Fact Book 2002
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might either be anomalously high or anomalously low around barrier levels, but an
expectation based on prior research is that there will be a lower frequency around
significant barrier levels (Donaldson and Kim, 1993) as these act as resistance and
support levels with traders more reluctant to trade close to these levels. The second
strata of clustering is at the micro-level around the ending digits of prices. Clus-
tering can be observed at this level by higher frequency around the low-level digits
(e.g. ending digits of 5 or 0 in prices) due to the rounding phenomenon (Ikenberry
and Weston, 2008). This latter is a particularly interesting feature given that we
have trade-by-trade data and thus can examine the impact of rounding at this level,
something which the previous investigation of clustering around the euro crossover
by Sonnemans (2006) was unable to test due to using daily prices. Thus, we test for
both clustering features - high frequency of clustering at low-level ending digits and
low clustering around significant price barriers.
For the specification of price barriers, we consider two criteria; first the price
range of the stocks and second the availability of currency denominations. During
the drachma era we consider the 10s, 100s and 1000s digits, while in the euro era we
examine the decimals digits and the 1s digits. These tests examine two-digit pairs
that are constructed from each variable. For example, and referring to the drachma
era, the 10s digits examine the two-digit pair to the left of the decimal point (i.e.
the decades or - -XX.-). Similarly the 100s digits examine the two-digit pair to the
left of the first digit to the immediate left of the decimal point (i.e. the hundreds
or -XX-.-) and the 1000s digits examine the thousands (XX–.-). Moving to the euro
era, the decimal digits are defined as the two-digit pairs to the immediate right of
the decimal point (i.e. the eurocents or –.XX) whereas the 1s digits are defined as
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the two digits that bracket the decimal point (i.e. –X.X-). For each of the previously
mentioned barriers we utilize a range of barrier regions; 5, 10, and 15, besides the
strict test on the exact barrier that may be denoted as 0. Hence assuming a price
of 100 drachmae, the barrier regions are defined as 100 drachmae for the strict test,
then a price range of 95-105 for the 5 barrier region, 90-110 for the 10 barrier region,
and 85-115 for the 15 barrier region.
The barrier proximity test is carried out using two approaches; a Panel Poisson
model and a Panel OLS model. In both cases we are testing variations of the equation:
(1)f (M) = α + βDi + ε
where f (M) is either the absolute or relative frequency of transactions and D is a
binary variable taking the value of 1 when the price is within the examined barrier
region and 0 otherwise.
The Panel Poisson allows us to explicitly take account of the fact that we are
working with count data, while addressing the potential misspecification of a normal
error distribution. We use absolute frequency of pricing for f (M) and include robust
errors. The secondary approach we follow is a Panel OLS with bootstrapping (1000
repetitions per dummy variable; Cameron and Trivedi (2005)) as adopted from the
prior literature (Donaldson and Kim, 1993). In the OLS testing we examine relative
frequency of the digits under investigation. In both cases, under the null hypothesis
of no barriers, the estimated coefficient on the binary variable will be zero. Rejection
of the null against a two-sided alternative would give prima facie evidence for the
existence of clustering. Separate tests are run for the drachma and euro period in
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order to identify currency-specific effects, and the tests are also rerun for drachma-
converted levels in the euro period and euro-converted levels in the drachma period.
2.3 Psychological barriers methodology
The existence of rounding clustering in prices, although important for price discovery,
does not necessarily have particularly strong implications for the trader or investor
except to the extent that it speaks about market efficiency. However, clustering
around price barriers could be indicative of abnormal trading around these barriers
and thus can have direct implications for traders. For example, technical analysts
have used the terms support and resistance lines to refer to the differentiated response
of stock market returns when psychological barriers are approached. Psychological
barriers can be approached by rising or falling prices, so we can test for different
price behaviors depending on whether the barrier was breached through a rise or
fall. We can also test what happens after a barrier has been breached through rising
or falling prices. For these tests we use the trade-by-trade data for the main tests to
determine the impact of crossing a price barrier on subsequent trades, and also run
tests on daily closing prices to see if there is any impact on future daily returns from
crossing a barrier. To examine these conditional effects, we use an OLS framework
with four indicator variables that identify certain conditions based on whether the
barrier is approached from rising or falling prices and what happens to the share price
following the barrier breach. Specifically, and in line with Dowling et al. (2016), we
introduce the following four indicator variables:
• BDBn: Value of 1 in the n trades/days before a downward barrier breach, 0
otherwise
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• ADBn: Value of 1 in the n trades/days after a downward barrier breach, 0
otherwise
• BUBn: Value of 1 in the n trades/days before an upward barrier breach, 0
otherwise
• AUBn: Value of 1 in the n trades/days after an upward barrier breach, 0
otherwise
where n denotes the number of trades or days (depending on whether we are using
trade-by-trade or daily data) before or after the particular breach as a measure of
responsiveness of market reaction to barrier breaches. We choose values of n = 1,
2, 3, 4, 5 trades in order to track the impact on up to the following five trades,
and do the same for daily data but just report n = 1, 2, 5 days to keep the table
sizes manageable4. For trade-by-trade data we group all transactions across the
five equities together although subsequent trades following a barrier breach for a
particular equity are always for the same equity. For the daily data we test the
equities individually. Our testing also includes a first-order autoregressive term for
potential autocorrelation in the returns. Formally the equation tested is therefore:
(2)Rt = β0 + β1Rt−1 + β2BDBnt + β3BUB
n
t + β4ADB
n
t + β5AUB
n
t + εt
As we are primarily interested in the differential reaction of market players fol-
lowing the introduction of the euro, we estimate the above regression separately for
the drachma and euro periods. For the daily data we also estimate the regression
using drachma-denominated levels in the euro period and euro-denominated levels
in the drachma period.
4The purpose of these selected days is to report the immediate impact and the impact over the space of a week.
The omitted results were qualitatively similar to the reported results and are available upon request.
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3 Empirical findings
3.1 Price clustering
The core findings for clustering are contained in Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1, with the
tables comprising the Panel Poisson regressions for drachma and euro respectively,
and each divided into the sub-periods of 1998-2000 and 2001-2003. Tables 3 and 4,
report the drachma and euro findings applying OLS regressions in line with the prior
literature. These findings confirm that clustering is a major feature in the pricing of
Greek equities over the time period studied, but particularly before the crossover to
euro pricing. This can be seen graphically in Figure 1 for 100s drachma and decimal
digits of euro. Panel A shows clustering in drachma during the drachma period with
spikes in clustering around 00 and 50 prices, followed by individual 10s of drachma.
Clustering around drachma-equivalent euro levels is not a feature of the euro period
as seen in Panel B. Clustering is also somewhat evident around decimal digits of euro
during the euro area, with larger frequencies in the 0 range and 40-60 range, but the
effect is not as pronounced as for drachma clustering.
Turning to the formal results, for the OLS drachma results in Table 1 traded
prices clustered strictly around whole values of 10 drachma (Pseudo R-square =
0.82) and 100 drachma (Pseudo R-square = 0.70) in the 1998-2000 period despite
the minimum tick size being just 5 drachma. There was also negative clustering
around 1000 drachma prices, showing a lower than expected frequency of prices
around these larger price levels. This finding of positive price clustering in low digits
and negative price clustering in significant barrier regions such as 1000 drachma, is
in line with previous findings on clustering, albeit that our study also shows this
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to be present using ultra high frequency data. The results for euro over the same
1998-2000 period in Table 2 confirm, as expected, essentially no euro-denominated
clustering during the period when prices were in drachma. We might have seen some
euro clustering during this period if traders and investors had switched over their
trading systems to euro pricing before the official switch, but this was evidentially
not the case 5. The OLS findings in Tables 3 (drachma) and 4 largely echo these
findings.
The findings for the period 2001-2003 after the switchover to euro pricing show a
mixture of declining but continued drachma clustering, and mixed evidence of new
euro clustering. In Table 1 for the Poisson tests we see some evidence that prices
continue to cluster around 10s of drachmae (Pseudo R-square = 0.25). Although in
general, drachma clustering is significantly decreased. This can also be seen in the
OLS results in Table 3, where there is a continued presence of drachma clustering
but evident decline in importance as seen in the R-square values. Table 2 (Poisson)
and 4 (OLS) give mixed findings for euro price clustering. The OLS results suggest
new clustering around the decimal digits of euros (R-square = 0.50 for the strict
price point), although the clustering around 1s of euros remains minor. The Poisson
results, however, show no support for any new euro clustering. Given that Poisson
model is better specified as it is an explicit count model, and despite the prevalence
of OLS testing of barrier proximity in past papers, we are minded more towards the
Poisson finding of no new euro clustering. There are thus two interesting findings
here. First, that clustering continued to be denominated in drachma despite the
5Due to the nature of testing individual trades at volume, the significance levels are not a good measure of
economic significance due to very low standard errors associated with a very large number of observations (n). The
R-square values are a better way to assess the importance of clustering as they are not influenced by the number of
observations.
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switchover to euro, and second that euro clustering did not immediately start being
a feature of pricing. This suggests that, to some extent, prices continued to be viewed
in terms of drachma even after the switchover to euros implying at least an informal
dual euro/drachma pricing by traders. We thus have evidence of a sluggishness in
switching over to the new euro pricing framework and support for the aspiration level
hypothesis.
We now look in more detail at the evolution of clustering over time in order
to understand the nature of the crossover from drachma to euro clustering. We
repeat the clustering analysis using a rolling estimation. Specifically, Equation 1 is
re-estimated on a daily rolling regression basis throughout the entire sample, while
testing for the existence of drachma and euro price clustering. Figure 2, Panel A,
plots the adjusted R-square for the full set of rolling regressions for each of the five
stocks for drachmae clustering (100s digits) and Panel B repeats for the case of euro
clustering (decimal digits). The time evolution of the barriers shows graphically how
quickly clustering switched from being drachma denominated during the drachma
period, to not being a major feature of pricing post the switch in stock currency
denomination. A similar but weaker effect is seen in Panel B for euro clustering
around the switchover to euro pricing.
In order to formally detect for breaks in clustering, we regress the average adjusted
R-square of the five stocks on a constant and a linear trend while allowing for an
endogenous breakpoint detection following Bai and Perron (2003). The results of this
regression are presented in Table 5. The endogenous breakpoint detection identifies
three periods; two are during the drachma period, while the third extends from the
last month of the drachma circulation onwards. We can also see this break from
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a visual inspection of Figure 2 Panel A, which suggests that in the second period
(18/8/1999 – 5/12/2000) the strength of price clustering is reducing compared to
the first, possibly reflecting the simultaneous use of the two currencies during this
year. Drachmae price clustering at the 100s level drops out of significance about a
month prior to the establishment of the euro as the sole currency in Greece. The
euro barriers gain significance once the euro is introduced. However, this seems to
be a gradually phased in process across the years of the implementation. Moreover,
some idiosyncratic stock characteristics can affect the speed in which the new price
barrier levels become significant. For example, price barriers for Alpha Bank are
created faster than Vodafone as shown by the immediate rise in the significance of
the euro price barriers following the euro adoption in the case of the former versus a
belated rise in the latter case.
3.2 Psychological barriers
Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the regression testing
for conditional effects (Equation 2) using trade-by-trade data and estimated over the
drachma (Panel A, 100s drachma) and euro periods (Panel B, 1s euro).
The coefficients for ADB and AUB are of primary interest as they denote the
market reaction following a barrier breach. Hence, any statistical significance on
these indicator variables would give prima facie evidence that following a barrier
breach there is an abnormal return. First, in the drachma period for 100 drachma
levels, the ADB coefficient suggests that after a downward barrier breach returns
drop in the following trade, then bounce up for trades 2-5 with decreasing strength.
Conversely, the AUB coefficient suggests that after an upward barrier breach the
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return climbs further during the following trade, then decreases for trades 2-5 with
decreasing strength. In the euro period and crossing of whole euro barrier points, the
findings are similar with two key differences. First, in the magnitude of the statistical
significance of the AUB and ADB variables, this is noticeably lower compared to the
drachma period. For instance, the ADB coefficient for the following trade (n = 1) are
equal to -0.0232 and -0.0089 in the drachma and euro periods respectively. Second,
the persistence of the effect following a barrier breach appears to be shorter lived by
approximately 1 trade compared to the drachma period. Thus, the ADB coefficients
retain their statistical significance up to 5 trades following a breach whereas under
the euro period significance is retained for 4 trades.
Panel C of Table 6 presents a series of statistical significance tests for each reaction
window between the coefficients pertaining to the drachma and those of the euro
periods. It can be inferred that there is indeed a differential market response due to
the change in the currency and the associated relocation of the psychological barriers.
The core finding is that the drachma effects are larger than the euro effects. Of the
four reactions denoted by the respective indicator variables, those following a barrier
breach are those that show the most significant. These findings, combined with
the findings for clustering, suggest that after a changeover to a new pricing regime it
takes traders a period of time to start being influenced by new psychological barriers.
A last analysis we run is tests for the presence of daily psychological barriers, this
analysis is run for each equity individually and is reported in Tables 7-11. These tests
cover 100s and 1000s barrier levels of drachma and 1s and 10s of euro. Euro-converted
barrier levels are also tested in the drachma period, and similarly drachma-converted
barriers are tested in the euro period.
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The main finding is of minor significance across all the barrier levels and all the
currencies. For the few significant findings that are present the weak pattern is of
significant euro barriers in the euro period. For example, in Table 8 we find that
prices fall back in the subsequent week after rising through a whole e10 barrier for
the National Bank of Greece stock.
As we are testing 1,000 coefficients across all five tables6 there is a considerable
probability that even the reported significance findings for the daily psychological
barriers are there by chance. To account for the potential that the significant findings
we have are there by chance we run a Generalised Bonferroni p-value correction as
proposed by Romano et al. (2010) which adjusts the acceptable p-value level to
account for the number of coefficients tested using the formula pˆ(i) ≤ α(i) ≡ k · α/s
where s is the total number of coefficients tested (1,000 in our case), k is the number
of false discoveries we wish to control for, and α is the significance level. We follow
Berk et al. (2017) and set k at 5 percent or 50 coefficients, and α at 10 percent,
meaning the Bonferroni corrected p-value is 0.005.
When we re-examine Tables 7-11 with this new p-value as the null rejection level,
we find that only four of the barrier variables, including the three e10 time variables
for National Bank of Greece noted above, remain significant. This suggests that daily
psychological barriers are not a major feature in pricing, and shows the advantage
of our transaction level psychological barriers tests, which were able to capture the
impact of crossing barriers on subsequent trading at the micro-level.
6Five variables per time period x two time periods x five equities x five days (although only three days are
reported) x 4 currency barriers (2 drachma, 2 euro) = 1,000 coefficient tests.
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4 Conclusions
With our dataset of ultra high frequency trades for the five largest equities in Greece
at the time of the crossover from the drachma to the euro currency we demonstrate
a currency-related crossover of the presence of psychological barriers, but continued
presence of clustering in the old currency.
This finding builds on the findings of Sonnemans (2006) for the Dutch market,
but also takes the research a number of significant steps forward. First, we extend
testing into a period when there is only euro pricing, as opposed to a period of
dual euro-original currency pricing as studied by Sonnemans (2006). Second, we use
transactions data as opposed to problematic daily closing prices to provide rolling
regression estimates of how clustering reacts to the changeover to the euro. We show
a significant reduction in drachma clustering upon adopting the euro, but that it
continued to be a presence for at least the three years after crossover to euro pricing.
Third, we are also able to use our dataset to identify that euro-focused clustering
did not become a feature immediately after adoption of the euro, suggesting that
clustering is a learned behaviour and it takes investors time to adopt new clustering
practices. Our speed of currency crossover findings support the conclusion that
clustering seems to be mainly related to anchoring to past prices supporting the
aspiration level hypothesis.
The other novel set of contributions of the work is in the investigation of pricing
behavior following the crossing of a psychologically important price point. Here
we once again use the transaction level data and are able to show an influence
on subsequent trades following a trade that crosses a barrier level. The normal
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behavior we observe being that the subsequent trade continues the price trend and
the following trades lead to a partial reversal. That we are able to show the presence
of predictable trading following breach of a barrier at the transaction level, as opposed
to daily prices as applied in the prior research, is an interesting contribution in
itself with wider application, but we also demonstrate a crossover of the relevant
barriers upon change of currency. Our daily data psychological barrier results suggest
that daily data tests miss the presence of these barriers and the impact of currency
crossover, as psychological barriers are not found to be present at the daily level.
Recent research is increasingly identifying the presence and importance of clus-
tering and psychological barriers across a whole range of financial markets outside of
equities. Our research therefore informs the development of this stream, by showing
that clustering retains links to past pricing and transfers to current pricing in a slow
manner, and arguing that the standard practice of seeking to identify psychological
barriers using daily data can miss important transaction level predictability in pric-
ing caused by these barriers. This last aspect is particularly important as the bulk
of equity speculation rapidly moves to the ultra high frequency level away from the
longer trading horizons of the past.
We end the study by noting a limitation of this research. Despite our tests being
at the trade-by-trade level we are still not able to distinguish which type of traders
are more likely to engage in price clustering or trade in particular ways around
psychologically important price points as we don’t have any trader identifications
attached to trades. It was noted in the data section that investment in Greek equities
consists of about 30% Greek retail investors, 40% Greek institutional investors, and
30% foreign investors. It would have been informative to know if a certain group of
20
these investors was driving our findings. This would speak to whether the patterns
were caused by, for example, professional trading habits, by sizes of transactions, or
by behavioral factors such as risk aversion or risk seeking relative to reference points.
We suggest this disaggregation of trades by trader type approach to future research,
subject to data availability, and it is an area we intend to also explore in a future
study.
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Figure 1: Frequency distribution of drachma 100s and euro decimal digits. (All Stocks)
25
Figure 2: Evolution of clustering over time. The figure plots the average R-squared of the five
stocks from the barrier proximity tests (see Tables 1 and 2) [left] and for the individual stocks
[right]. Panel A presents the case of the Drachma denominated period and Panel B repeats for the
Euro period.
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Table 1: Panel Poisson: Absolute clustering in Greek equity prices (drachma)
Years: 1998-2000 Years: 2001-2003
n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15
A. 10s digits
beta 1.573*** 1.197*** 0.996*** 0.886*** 2.144*** 0.569*** 0.422*** 0.326***
SE 0.046 0.016 0.010 0.026 0.177 0.074 0.031 0.018
Pseudo R-Square 0.82 0.44 0.26 0.16 0.25 0.05 0.03 0.02
B. 100s digits
beta 0.978*** 0.851*** 0.695*** 0.630*** 1.086*** 0.463*** 0.467*** 0.383***
SE 0.008 0.017 0.023 0.029 0.050 0.031 0.028 0.018
Pseudo R-square 0.70 0.51 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.13
C. 1000s digits
beta -0.029*** -0.064*** -0.083*** -0.128*** 0.028*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.041***
SE 0.011 0.012 0.018 0.034 0.052 0.069 0.072 0.046
Pseudo R-square 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Results from the barrier proximity tests using drachma pricing for all Greek equities listed in Section 2 using
a Panel Poisson regression with robust errors for absolute frequency of pricing. Results cover period 1998-2003
and are reported in sub-periods of 1998-2000 (pre-crossover) and 2001-2003 (after-crossover). Tests are a regres-
sion of f (M) = α + βDi + ε. n is the percentage range of the barrier region, e.g. n=10 is ±10% of the
strict currency barrier level. The barrier ranges are defined as follows: BR(0)=00; BR(5)=95,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,05;
BR(10)=90,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,10; BR(15)=85,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,15. The defined barriers are represented by a dummy vari-
able taking the value 1 when the required digits fall in the barrier range and zero otherwise. Each panel focuses on
different digits, with Panel A analyzing the 10s digits, Panel B the 100s digits, and Panel C the 1000s digits. The
construction of the digits is explained in section 2.2. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 2: Panel Poisson: Absolute clustering in Greek equity prices (euro)
Years: 1998-2000 Years: 2001-2003
n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15
A. decimal digits
beta 0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 0.012 0.008 0.000 0.018*
SE 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.010 0.030 0.020 0.009 0.009
R-square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B. 1s digits
beta 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.021* -0.027 0.034 0.035 0.027*
SE 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.012
R-square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Results from the barrier proximity tests using euro pricing for all Greek equities listed in Section 2 using a Panel
Poisson regression with robust errors for absolute frequency of pricing. Results cover period 1998-2003 and are re-
ported in subperiods of 1998-2000 (pre-crossover) and 2001-2003 (after-crossover). Tests are a regression of f (M) =
α+ βDi + ε. n is the percentage range of the barrier region, e.g. n=10 is ±10% of the strict currency barrier level.
The barrier ranges are defined as follows: BR(0)=00; BR(5)=95,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,05; BR(10)=90,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,10;
BR(15)=85,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,15. The defined barriers are represented by a dummy variable taking the value 1 when
the required digits fall in the barrier range and zero otherwise. Each panel focuses on different digits, with Panel A
analyzing the decimal digits and Panel B the 1s digits. The construction of the digits is explained in section 2.2. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Panel OLS: Relative clustering in Greek equity prices (drachma)
Years: 1998-2000 Years: 2001-2003
n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15
A. 10s digits
beta 0.146*** 0.112*** 0.085*** 0.075*** 0.176*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.006***
SE 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000
R-square 0.92 0.63 0.40 0.32 0.67 0.06 0.04 0.02
B. 100s digits
beta 0.026*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.030*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001***
SE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
R-square 0.45 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.28 0.02 0.04 0.01
C. 1000s digits
beta -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.007***
SE 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-square 0.01 0.15 0.32 0.48 0.01 0.14 0.29 0.38
Results from the barrier proximity tests using drachma pricing for all Greek equities listed in Section 2 using a Panel
OLS regression with bootstrapping for relative frequency of pricing. Results cover period 1998-2003 and are re-
ported in sub-periods of 1998-2000 (pre-crossover) and 2001-2003 (after-crossover). Tests are a regression of f (M) =
α+ βDi + ε. n is the percentage range of the barrier region, e.g. n=10 is ±10% of the strict currency barrier level.
The barrier ranges are defined as follows: BR(0)=00; BR(5)=95,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,05; BR(10)=90,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,10;
BR(15)=85,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,15. The defined barriers are represented by a dummy variable taking the value 1 when
the required digits fall in the barrier range and zero otherwise. Each panel focuses on different digits, with Panel
A analyzing the 10s digits, Panel B the 100s digits, and Panel C the 1000s digits. The construction of the digits is
explained in section 2.2. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
29
Table 4: Panel OLS: Relative clustering in Greek equity prices (euro)
Years: 1998-2000 Years: 2001-2003
n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15 n = 0 n = 5 n = 10 n = 15
A. decimal digits
beta 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
SE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-square 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.50 0.14 0.12 0.06
B. 1s digits
beta 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000**
SE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-square 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Results from the barrier proximity tests using euro pricing for all Greek equities listed in Section 2 using a Panel
OLS regression with bootstrapping for relative frequency of pricing. Results cover period 1998-2003 and are re-
ported in subperiods of 1998-2000 (pre-crossover) and 2001-2003 (after-crossover). Tests are a regression of f (M) =
α+ βDi + ε. n is the percentage range of the barrier region, e.g. n=10 is ±10% of the strict currency barrier level.
The barrier ranges are defined as follows: BR(0)=00; BR(5)=95,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,05; BR(10)=90,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,10;
BR(15)=85,96,. . . 00,. . . 04,15. The defined barriers are represented by a dummy variable taking the value 1 when
the required digits fall in the barrier range and zero otherwise. Each panel focuses on different digits, with Panel A
analyzing the decimal digits and Panel B the 1s digits. The construction of the digits is explained in section 2.2. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Structural breaks in clustering over time
Average R2 drachma barriers Average R2 euro barriers
Period I: 2/1/1998 – 17/8/1999 Period I: 2/1/1998 – 28/11/2000
Constant 0.6726*** 0.0037***
0.0429 0.0011
Trend 0.0001 0.0002***
0.0003 0.0001
Period II: 18/8/1999 – 5/12/2000 Period II: 29/11/2000 – 30/07/2002
Constant 1.2010*** 0.1276***
0.0429 0.0166
Trend -0.0009*** -0.0001***
0.0001 0.0001
Period III: 6/12/2000 – 31/12/2003 Period III: 31/07/2002 – 31/12/2003
Constant 0.0434*** 0.3882***
0.0142 0.0523
Trend 0.0001** -0.0002***
0.0001 0.0001
N 1,564 1,564
Adjusted R2 0.9587 0.797
Table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis of the endogenous breakpoint regression for
the average adjusted R2 related to the evolution of the price clustering. The table presents the results (estimated
coefficients and standard errors) of the Bai and Perron (2003) structural breakpoint test on the average R-squared
of the five stocks from the barrier proximity tests (see Tables 2 and 3). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Psychological barriers and trade-by-trade data
n trades n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
Panel A: Conditional effects during the drachma period (100s drachma)
Rt−1 -0.2731*** -0.2950*** -0.2840*** -0.2831*** -0.2829***
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
BDBnt 0.0866*** 0.0558*** 0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0017
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
BUBnt -0.1403*** -0.0790*** -0.0098*** -0.0041** -0.0017
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
ADBnt -0.0232*** 0.0625*** 0.0353*** 0.0154*** 0.0083***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
AUBnt 0.0612*** -0.0311*** -0.0206*** -0.0095*** -0.0048***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Panel B: Conditional effects during the euro period (1s euro)
Rt−1 -0.2972*** -0.3172*** -0.3064*** -0.3058*** -0.3058***
0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
BDBnt 0.0553*** 0.0428*** 0.0020 -0.0022 -0.0020
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
BUBnt -0.0914*** -0.0574*** -0.0062*** 0.0004 -0.0014
0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
ADBnt -0.0089*** 0.0443*** 0.0188*** 0.0069*** 0.0028*
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
AUBnt 0.0439*** -0.0255*** -0.0109*** -0.0048*** -0.0021
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
Panel C: Statistical significance tests (drachma vs euro)
BDBnt 899.230*** 353.410*** 0.050 0.020 0.310
0.000 0.000 0.823 0.889 0.578
BUBnt 1796.770*** 685.030*** 15.900*** 5.960** 0.510
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.476
ADBnt 85.260*** 451.030*** 202.520*** 45.570*** 14.360***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AUBnt 454.940*** 115.050*** 78.750*** 16.640*** 5.390**
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020
Panel A and B in the table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors of the conditional effects model of Sec-
tion 2.3 using trade-by-trade data. BDBn takes the value 1 before a downward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. BUBn
takes the value 1 before an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. ADBn takes the value 1 after a downward barrier
breach, 0 otherwise. AUBn takes the value 1 after an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. n denotes the reaction
window that allows us to assess the market reaction speed between 1-5 subsequent trades ((n=1,2,3,4 and 5). Panel
A focuses in the Drachma denominated period and the 100s digits, while Panel B repeats for the Euro denominated
period and the 1s digits. Panel C presents F-statistics and p-values for the statistical significance tests for the equal-
ity of the coefficients between the two period on each occasion. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 7: Psychological barriers in equity pricing (stock: OTE)
100s Drachma 1000s Drachma 1s Euro 10s Euro
1998-2000 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5
Rt−1 0.1081** 0.0949** 0.0918** 0.1172*** 0.0892** 0.0842** 0.1067** 0.0956** 0.0892** 0.1120*** 0.1032*** 0.0907**
0.016 0.018 0.014 0.010 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.007 0.009 0.016
BDBnt 0.0011 -0.0023 -0.0013 -0.0060 -0.0036 0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0026 0.0015 -0.0112* -0.0067 0.0013
0.840 0.531 0.829 0.123 0.259 0.855 0.690 0.434 0.757 0.069 0.148 0.713
BUBnt 0.0089 0.0004 0.0014 0.0062 0.0004 0.0035 0.0063 -0.0010 -0.0001 0.0020 0.0010 -0.0021
0.102 0.907 0.799 0.112 0.893 0.293 0.109 0.757 0.987 0.727 0.815 0.548
ADBnt 0.0080 0.0042 0.0026 -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0038 0.0001 0.0027 -0.0002 0.0064 0.0051 0.0006
0.151 0.264 0.674 0.691 0.781 0.262 0.977 0.432 0.969 0.335 0.296 0.862
AUBnt 0.0061 0.0032 0.0010 -0.0064 -0.0001 -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0017 0.0002 -0.0036 0.0002 0.0002
0.272 0.373 0.865 0.134 0.988 0.551 0.704 0.624 0.962 0.554 0.970 0.961
2001-2003
Rt−1 -0.0381 0.0257 0.0395 0.0509 0.0562 0.0441 0.0715 0.0310 0.0400 0.0368 0.0326 0.0441
0.542 0.575 0.305 0.207 0.155 0.252 0.145 0.467 0.302 0.330 0.389 0.238
BDBnt -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0021 0.0004 0.0018 0.0004 -0.0019 -0.0068 -0.0056*
0.817 0.821 0.986 0.723 0.749 0.295 0.857 0.282 0.805 0.753 0.117 0.065
BUBnt 0.0015 0.0017 0.0013 0.0001 0.0010 0.0013 0.0053** 0.0031* 0.0021 -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0025
0.410 0.250 0.491 0.975 0.709 0.551 0.018 0.067 0.171 0.848 0.697 0.433
ADBnt -0.0061*** -0.0035** -0.0038* -0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0022 0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0014 -0.0040 -0.0020 0.0020
0.004 0.037 0.069 0.622 0.846 0.296 0.850 0.373 0.360 0.521 0.650 0.516
AUBnt -0.0003 -0.0012 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0012 -0.0013 0.0014 0.0018 0.0159** 0.0114** 0.0043
0.895 0.479 0.812 0.924 0.816 0.595 0.607 0.445 0.245 0.013 0.014 0.182
Table reports estimated coefficients and p-values for Equation 2 using daily closing prices. BDBn takes the value 1 before a downward barrier breach, 0
otherwise. BUBn takes the value 1 before an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. ADBn takes the value 1 after a downward barrier breach, 0 otherwise.
AUBn takes the value 1 after an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. n denotes the reaction window that allows us to assess, in particular, the market
reaction speed for 1, 2, and 5 days following a barrier breach. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 8: Psychological barriers in equity pricing (stock: NBG)
100s Drachma 1000s Drachma 1s Euro 10s Euro
1998-2000 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5
Rt−1 - 0.0207 0.0008 0.0203 - 0.0058 0.0247 0.0160 - 0.0145 0.0152 0.0156 0.0032 0.0007 0.0004
0.758 0.986 0.619 0.894 0.563 0.691 0.788 0.751 0.705 0.938 0.986 0.992
BDBnt 0.0041 0.0052** 0.0084** 0.0048 0.0062 0.0065 0.0051 0.0021 0.0060** 0.0068 - 0.0223 - 0.0151
0.183 0.046 0.031 0.523 0.262 0.170 0.199 0.483 0.034 0.834 0.333 0.301
BUBnt 0.0034 0.0031 - 0.0029 0.0005 0.0065 - 0.0048 - 0.0014 - 0.0005 - 0.0034 - 0.0018 0.0071 0.0187
0.289 0.245 0.350 0.947 0.229 0.297 0.717 0.879 0.231 0.938 0.663 0.200
ADBnt - 0.0007 - 0.0019 0.0029 0.0015 0.0106* 0.0072 - 0.0015 0.0017 0.0002 - 0.0064 - 0.0020 - 0.0238
0.843 0.505 0.460 0.844 0.062 0.125 0.729 0.608 0.944 0.845 0.931 0.246
AUBnt 0.0022 - 0.0008 - 0.0035 0.0090 - 0.0026 - 0.0038 0.0033 0.0003 - 0.0044 0.0262 0.0190 0.0164
0.608 0.790 0.256 0.244 0.642 0.423 0.486 0.921 0.131 0.264 0.251 0.115
2001-2003
Rt−1 - 0.0374 - 0.0332 - 0.0112 - 0.0034 - 0.0090 - 0.0187 0.0246 0.0098 0.0048 0.0005 - 0.0074 - 0.0055
0.486 0.449 0.770 0.928 0.812 0.617 0.557 0.805 0.901 0.990 0.840 0.880
BDBnt 0.0015 0.0020 0.0008 - 0.0103* - 0.0007 - 0.0051* - 0.0024 0.0024 0.0015 0.0258 0.0475*** 0.0360***
0.485 0.246 0.627 0.073 0.871 0.083 0.404 0.270 0.395 0.141 0.000 0.000
BUBnt 0.0023 0.0017 0.0017 - 0.0003 0.0003 0.0014 - 0.0023 0.0003 - 0.0013 0.0275* 0.0074 - 0.0282***
0.307 0.337 0.325 0.964 0.938 0.675 0.441 0.908 0.497 0.069 0.497 0.008
ADBnt - 0.0047* - 0.0036* - 0.0019 0.0026 - 0.0022 - 0.0022 0.0013 0.0008 0.0003 - 0.0278** - 0.0013 0.0116
0.062 0.054 0.269 0.652 0.585 0.487 0.668 0.719 0.854 0.026 0.904 0.224
AUBnt - 0.0009 0.0007 0.0018 0.0108* 0.0068 0.0085*** - 0.0027 - 0.0011 - 0.0003 - 0.0516*** - 0.0582*** - 0.0320***
0.725 0.731 0.308 0.074 0.113 0.006 0.403 0.652 0.878 0.003 0.000 0.001
Table reports estimated coefficients and p-values for Equation 2 using daily closing prices. BDBn takes the value 1 before a downward barrier breach, 0 oth-
erwise. BUBn takes the value 1 before an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. ADBn takes the value 1 after a downward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. AUBn
takes the value 1 after an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. n denotes the reaction window that allows us to assess, in particular, the market reaction speed
for 1, 2, and 5 days following a barrier breach. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 9: Psychological barriers in equity pricing (stock: Alpha Bank)
100s Drachma 1000s Drachma 1s Euro 10s Euro
1998-2000 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5
Rt−1 - 0.0433 - 0.0281 - 0.0188 - 0.0450 - 0.0347 - 0.0258 - 0.0456 - 0.0223 - 0.0187 - 0.0280 - 0.0255 - 0.0208
0.284 0.464 0.613 0.271 0.366 0.492 0.266 0.562 0.614 0.480 0.511 0.579
BDBnt - 0.0082 - 0.0121** - 0.0130* - 0.0049 - 0.0111** - 0.0029 - 0.0050 - 0.0090** - 0.0053 - 0.0052 - 0.0038 0.0003
0.242 0.014 0.080 0.376 0.013 0.519 0.338 0.049 0.371 0.493 0.507 0.946
BUBnt - 0.0037 - 0.0031 0.0025 0.0008 0.0024 0.0040 - 0.0013 - 0.0002 0.0024 0.0093 0.0113** 0.0059
0.597 0.518 0.741 0.873 0.583 0.371 0.802 0.966 0.663 0.187 0.036 0.198
ADBnt - 0.0033 - 0.0001 - 0.0040 - 0.0060 - 0.0047 - 0.0075* - 0.0030 0.0020 - 0.0037 0.0036 - 0.0039 - 0.0048
0.646 0.985 0.599 0.289 0.305 0.097 0.584 0.669 0.538 0.652 0.512 0.314
AUBnt 0.0048 0.0053 0.0042 0.0057 0.0058 0.0010 0.0067 0.0061 0.0042 0.0138* 0.0025 0.0032
0.501 0.279 0.574 0.301 0.196 0.836 0.221 0.187 0.448 0.056 0.658 0.491
2001-2003
Rt−1 0.0267 0.0411 0.0549 0.1237*** 0.0998** 0.0791** 0.0999 0.0550 0.0596 0.1086*** 0.0852** 0.0966***
0.659 0.363 0.163 0.004 0.015 0.040 0.051 0.211 0.127 0.005 0.025 0.010
BDBnt - 0.0032* - 0.0005 - 0.0012 0.0028 - 0.0022 - 0.0020 - 0.0035* - 0.0039** - 0.0019 0.0035 - 0.0016 - 0.0040
0.084 0.782 0.600 0.374 0.361 0.288 0.097 0.019 0.247 0.529 0.698 0.195
BUBnt 0.0021 0.0033* 0.0020 - 0.0036 0.0000 0.0002 - 0.0012 0.0011 0.0031** - 0.0015 0.0030 - 0.0000
0.279 0.053 0.298 0.294 0.996 0.911 0.577 0.508 0.050 0.811 0.510 0.999
ADBnt - 0.0021 - 0.0021 - 0.0058** - 0.0001 - 0.0022 - 0.0034* 0.0035 - 0.0012 - 0.0034** 0.0028 - 0.0031 0.0006
0.339 0.260 0.013 0.980 0.384 0.081 0.152 0.495 0.047 0.631 0.460 0.843
AUBnt 0.0026 0.0023 0.0028 - 0.0050 - 0.0032 0.0017 0.0033 0.0034* 0.0029* - 0.0034 0.0063 - 0.0003
0.276 0.198 0.160 0.174 0.234 0.390 0.203 0.080 0.087 0.586 0.167 0.941
Table reports estimated coefficients and p-values for Equation 2 using daily closing prices. BDBn takes the value 1 before a downward barrier breach, 0 otherwise.
BUBn takes the value 1 before an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. ADBn takes the value 1 after a downward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. AUBn takes the
value 1 after an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. n denotes the reaction window that allows us to assess, in particular, the market reaction speed for 1, 2, and
5 days following a barrier breach. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 10: Psychological barriers in equity pricing (stock: HelPe)
100s Drachma 1000s Drachma 1s Euro 10s Euro
1998-2000 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5
Rt−1 - 0.1905*** - 0.1141*** - 0.0575 - 0.0562 - 0.0581 - 0.0446 - 0.1135** - 0.0975** - 0.0519 - 0.0367 - 0.0307 - 0.0370
0.002 0.008 0.133 0.192 0.152 0.245 0.041 0.025 0.179 0.343 0.416 0.317
BDBnt 0.0010 0.0025 - 0.0004 0.0094** 0.0058* 0.0022 - 0.0001 0.0021 0.0034 - 0.0017 0.0013 - 0.0010
0.691 0.255 0.899 0.019 0.053 0.377 0.957 0.309 0.126 0.758 0.751 0.767
BUBnt 0.0020 0.0032 0.0009 0.0008 0.0027 0.0028 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 - 0.0014 - 0.0063 - 0.0033
0.449 0.138 0.753 0.833 0.369 0.241 0.930 0.810 0.940 0.797 0.129 0.337
ADBnt - 0.0058** - 0.0043* - 0.0067** - 0.0013 - 0.0011 - 0.0008 - 0.0048 - 0.0054** - 0.0041* - 0.0008 0.0050 0.0049
0.044 0.064 0.045 0.763 0.723 0.735 0.112 0.017 0.074 0.896 0.245 0.165
AUBnt 0.0065** 0.0053** 0.0007 0.0029 0.0040 0.0000 0.0038 0.0026 - 0.0018 - 0.0020 - 0.0011 - 0.0006
0.038 0.021 0.815 0.510 0.215 0.991 0.241 0.266 0.426 0.729 0.796 0.869
2001-2003
Rt−1 - 0.0927 - 0.0443 - 0.0245 - 0.0181 - 0.0217 - 0.0264 - 0.0413 - 0.0442 - 0.0268 - 0.0155 - 0.0270 - 0.0115
0.124 0.319 0.522 0.643 0.569 0.483 0.340 0.284 0.489 0.680 0.474 0.756
BDBnt 0.0004 0.0024 0.0026 0.0017 0.0027 - 0.0025 0.0009 - 0.0007 - 0.0012 0.0057 - 0.0044 0.0032
0.806 0.118 0.200 0.717 0.434 0.306 0.720 0.723 0.471 0.333 0.332 0.370
BUBnt - 0.0017 0.0001 0.0010 - 0.0003 - 0.0051 0.0040 0.0031 0.0018 0.0020 0.0080 0.0093** - 0.0008
0.359 0.963 0.586 0.956 0.151 0.127 0.254 0.378 0.229 0.181 0.046 0.823
ADBnt - 0.0027 - 0.0011 0.0000 - 0.0001 - 0.0006 - 0.0026 0.0000 - 0.0013 - 0.0002 - 0.0059 - 0.0055 0.0000
0.217 0.519 0.991 0.981 0.858 0.303 0.986 0.549 0.894 0.325 0.236 0.990
AUBnt 0.0027 0.0018 0.0028 0.0028 0.0047 0.0037 0.0054* 0.0041* 0.0023 - 0.0021 0.0025 - 0.0018
0.223 0.268 0.126 0.576 0.196 0.161 0.069 0.063 0.177 0.724 0.589 0.608
Table reports estimated coefficients and p-values for Equation 2 using daily closing prices. BDBn takes the value 1 before a downward barrier breach, 0 oth-
erwise. BUBn takes the value 1 before an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. ADBn takes the value 1 after a downward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. AUBn
takes the value 1 after an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. n denotes the reaction window that allows us to assess, in particular, the market reaction speed
for 1, 2, and 5 days following a barrier breach. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Psychological barriers in equity pricing (stock: Vodafone)
100s Drachma 1000s Drachma 1s Euro 10s Euro
1998-2000 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5 n = 1 n = 2 n = 5
Rt−1 0.0268 0.0293 0.0145 0.0162 0.0560 0.0273 0.0063 0.0461 0.0203 - 0.0019 - 0.0014 0.0074
0.630 0.541 0.747 0.740 0.237 0.543 0.908 0.348 0.654 0.970 0.977 0.871
BDBnt - 0.0042 - 0.0022 0.0002 0.0037 - 0.0072 0.0026 0.0014 - 0.0020 0.0017 - 0.0034 0.0232 0.0195
0.387 0.624 0.973 0.611 0.190 0.555 0.791 0.633 0.683 0.905 0.219 0.111
BUBnt 0.0027 0.0009 - 0.0042 0.0050 0.0031 - 0.0058 0.0041 0.0029 - 0.0027 0.0141 0.0290 0.0154
0.590 0.831 0.410 0.499 0.571 0.197 0.432 0.494 0.510 0.659 0.201 0.324
ADBnt 0.0021 0.0045 - 0.0054 0.0037 0.0077 0.0044 0.0033 0.0045 0.0013 - 0.0189 - 0.0122 - 0.0026
0.688 0.323 0.408 0.624 0.174 0.332 0.561 0.303 0.763 0.522 0.535 0.834
AUBnt 0.0003 0.0011 - 0.0050 0.0053 - 0.0143** - 0.0119*** 0.0055 - 0.0043 - 0.0027 0.0255 - 0.0074 - 0.0044
0.951 0.798 0.331 0.490 0.014 0.008 0.354 0.342 0.516 0.467 0.749 0.765
2001-2003
Rt−1 - 0.0084 - 0.0555 - 0.0507 - 0.0204 - 0.0285 - 0.0205 - 0.0264 - 0.0413 - 0.0300
0.865 0.187 0.192 0.592 0.446 0.580 0.507 0.287 0.425
BDBnt 0.0017 0.0027 - 0.0003 0.0038 0.0036 0.0029 - 0.0004 - 0.0011 - 0.0001
0.477 0.131 0.859 0.405 0.285 0.267 0.917 0.702 0.969
BUBnt 0.0005 0.0011 0.0009 - 0.0006 0.0024 - 0.0012 - 0.0002 0.0034 0.0015
0.829 0.552 0.581 0.892 0.469 0.676 0.968 0.234 0.484
ADBnt 0.0024 - 0.0010 - 0.0019 0.0048 0.0004 0.0030 - 0.0001 - 0.0029 - 0.0014
0.378 0.597 0.236 0.300 0.917 0.272 0.987 0.311 0.503
AUBnt - 0.0002 0.0028 0.0026 - 0.0001 - 0.0003 - 0.0029 - 0.0002 0.0017 - 0.0009
0.940 0.147 0.112 0.980 0.938 0.293 0.968 0.552 0.678
Table reports estimated coefficients and p-values for Equation 2 using daily closing prices. BDBn takes the value 1 before a downward barrier
breach, 0 otherwise. BUBn takes the value 1 before an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. ADBn takes the value 1 after a downward barrier
breach, 0 otherwise. AUBn takes the value 1 after an upward barrier breach, 0 otherwise. n denotes the reaction window that allows us to assess,
in particular, the market reaction speed for 1, 2, and 5 days following a barrier breach. Note: for Vodafone there are no relevant e10 barrier points
during the euro period. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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